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Abstract 
 
 Based on the model of seemingly 
unrelated regressions, this paper develops 
an approach which can help the 
government screen disease codes for 
upcoding behavior driven by the financial 
incentives due to the Prospective Payment 
System (PPS) without causing much 
expense. Using mainly the SPARCS 
data, this paper examines specific 
categories of heart disease based on the 
frequency of assignment of codes first 
and shows that the hospitals may have 
relabeled the cases of angina pectoris 
(ICD-9-CM 413) as other forms of 
chronic ischemic heart disease 
(ICD-9-CM 414) so that they may receive 
more reimbursement.  It then uses the 
approach, which it develops, to show that 
the “upcoding” is in fact not due to the 
PPS financial incentives. 
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Motivation and Purpose 
 
 The Prospective Payment System 
(PPS) was implemented in the United 
States of America in 1983.  Taiwan also 
began to phase in the PPS system in 1995.   
The Prospective Payment System is a 
system for price control based on 
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). 
Because it shifts the payment system 
from a per-service to a per-case basis, it 
may affect admissions. Some observers 
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predict that hospital admissions would 
increase; others believe they would 
decrease.  The coexistence of these two 
extremes may occur if providers upcode 
discharges, which is an opportunity 
offered by DRG, as Zimmerman (1984) 
observed. 
There were three research projects 
focusing on examining DRG “creep.” 
Two of them appeared in 1990.  The 
Office of Inspector General (1990) found 
that 20.8 percent of 1985 Medicare Part A 
bills contained coding errors that changed 
the DRG and that 61.7 percent of these 
errors over-reimbursed the hospitals.   
In contrast, Carter et al. (1990) 
re-abstracted a nationally representative 
sample of 7,887 Medicare charts to 
determine how much of the change in 
Medicare’s Case Mix Index between 
1986 and 1987 was true change in the 
complexity of cases and how much was 
upcoding or  “DRG creep.”   They 
concluded that most of the additional $1 
billion paid to hospitals because of the 
Case Mix Index change appeared 
justified by the additional complexity of 
patients hospitalized.  The most recent 
research was done by Assaf et al. (1993).   
They examined the assignment of 
discharge diagnosis for coronary heart 
disease in Pawtucket, Rhode Island, and a 
city in Massachusetts from 1980 to 1988.  
They found that the frequency of codes 
for the acute forms of coronary heart 
disease (which entailed higher 
reimbursement) rose from 35.2 percent to 
48.4 percent among discharged patients 
with cardiac disease and the chronic 
forms of coronary heart disease (which 
entailed lower reimbursement) decreased 
reciprocally, from 64.8 percent to 51.6 
percent. These occurred after the 
institution of DRGs. However, they had 
difficulty in distinguishing whether 
hospitals began to assign more precise 
diagnoses with the advent of the PPS 
system, or whether they began to favor 
diagnoses of acute conditions solely for 
financial reasons.  
This paper hence attempts to 
develop an approach to help us clarify 
the issue regarding whether the “DRG 
creep” was driven by the financial 
incentives due to PPS.  The approach 
can help the government measure how 
severe it was and can help the 
government screen disease codes for 
upcoding behavior without causing 
much expense.  Moreover, it tests the 
DRG creep on heart disease in New 
York State as an example. 
 
Data 
 
Our data are mainly the number of 
cases admitted for categories of heart 
disease for each county of New York in 
calendar years 1986 to 1989, which 
comes from data tapes from the 
Statewide Planning and Research 
Cooperative (SPARCS) System of New 
York.  Variables for gender, race, age, 
and education are estimated by using 
census data collected from County and 
City Data Book of 1983 and 1994 and 
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various issues of New York State 
Statistical Yearbook. The data for 
cardiologists come from the Area 
Resource File of 1989 and 1991. The 
data for county population and the 
percent of urban population for each 
county come from the Area Resource 
File of 1993. The relative weights of the 
Diagnosis Related Groups are collected 
from various issues of Federal Register. 
 
Methodology  
 
    This research proceeds as the 
following.  First, it constructs two 
models for a typical hospital's 
decision-making process, which let the 
proportion of low-reimbursement 
discharges that are relabeled be a choice 
variable. A comparative static shows that 
the proportion of low-reimbursement 
discharges that are relabeled increases in 
the size of gain from relabeling a code 
and decreases in the amount of monetary 
equivalent of punishment.  Second, it 
examines number of cases admitted for 
categories of heart disease during 
1986-89 in New York State and 
investigates how the New York 
Prospective Hospital Reimbursement 
Methodology  (NYPHRM) and the 
Prospective Payment System of Medicare 
affect the admission of patients with 
ischemic heart diseases. Third, it develops 
an approach based on the seemingly 
unrelated regressions to estimating the 
PPS effect on relabeling behavior.  
Fourth, it applies its approach to the 
SPARCS data. 
 
The Results from Raw Data 
 
The frequency for angina pectoris 
(ICD-9-CM 413) had a negative trend 
while the total admissions for the chronic 
forms had a positive trend. For chronic 
forms, the only component that increased 
across the four-year period was 
ICD-9-CM 414. The relative weights for 
category 414 were higher than the relative 
weights for category 413. All cases of 413 
were reimbursed according to DRG 140. 
The relative weight for DRG 140 was the 
lowest relative weight among the 
categories of ischemic heart disease in 
1986 and 1987, and it was one of the 
lowest three relative weights in 1988 and 
1989.  Hence, hospitals may have 
carefully labeled or even relabeled the 
cases of 413 as 414 after PPS in order to 
receive more reimbursement; however, 
these new labels must be attested to by 
cardiologists. The trends for average 
length of stay and for average age are also 
consistent with this explanation. 
 
The Results from the Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions 
 
     The empirical results come from 
the seemingly unrelated regressions. The 
explained variables are the admission 
rates.  The explanatory variables 
include the NYPHRM dummy variable, 
the size of gain, the variables 
representing population characteristics 
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and lifestyle, and cardiologists per 
10,000 persons.   
The sign of variable of gain ( g ) is 
surprising.  It indicates that a typical 
hospital relabels less when the gain from 
relabeling the case of 413 as 414 
increases, although the parameter of g  
is insignificant in both equations. Since 
none of the parameter of variable g  is 
significant, we expect that the 
cross-equation restriction will hold. 
 The testing of the parameters of the 
seemingly unrelated regressions does 
not require the normality assumption 
when the sample size converges to 
infinity [Zellner (1962)]. However, for 
small samples there is some question 
about how to proceed. In this case, the 
sample size is 248, which seems to be 
large enough.  By taking logarithm, the 
admission data have better normality, 
and the sign of the variable g  does not 
change. We furthermore convert the 
admission data to the data with zero 
skewness. Using the zero-skewness data, 
we still get the same qualitative result 
for the variable g .  
 In sum, using our approach, the 
results show that the “ upcoding” is due 
to morbidity instead of PPS financial 
incentives. 
 
Discussions 
 
Since the U.S. attempted to make 
law more effective, a typical hospital 
could be deterred from relabeling 
disease. 
 The government established Peer 
Review Organizations to monitor 
physicians and hospitals in 1985.  To 
prevent fraud, the U.S. designed a control 
mechanism.   
Fearing that the medical profession 
could not be trusted---out of either 
concern for patients or self-interest---to 
follow the new guidelines strictly, 
Congress next created Peer Review 
Organizations (PROs) to serve as 
watchdogs for the DRG system. Unlike 
the failed Professional Standards 
Review Organization, the PROs were 
to be private companies that hired 
physicians to evaluate health-care 
related practices and determine whether 
services are reasonable and medically 
necessary, meet professionally 
recognized standards, and are provided 
economically. Up through 1987 the 
government had approved sixty-five 
PRO sanctions, mostly against 
physicians. 
In 1986, the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. 
$3729 et seq.) passed.  One aspect of 
the False Claims Act makes it unique 
among health care fraud statutes, and 
virtually unique among federal laws in 
general--private persons may enforce the 
Act on behalf of the United States.  If 
successful, shares in the recovery--a 
form of judicial bounty hunting. 
Therefore, it is possible that the PPS 
financial effect was cancelled out by the 
deterrence effect due to more effective 
law.  
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